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	THE DIRECTOR OF	CENTRAL INTELL	IGENCE		
	WASHING	TON, D. C. 20505	\$.		
National Intelligence Officers			NFAC 5261-80 25 July 1980		
MEMORANDUM FOR:	Director of Cent Deputy Director	ral Intelligenc of Central Inte	e 11igence		
VIA:	Deputy Director National Intelli	for National Fo gence Officer f	reign Assessment or Warning		
FROM:	Joe L. Zaring National Intelli	igence Officer f	or Western Europe		
SUBJECT:	Monthly Warning	Assessment: We	stern Europe		
I. Political violence has entered a still more intense and dangerous phase with the recent murders of former Prime Minister Erim and labor union leader Turkler. Protest strikes throughout Turkey could portend a more organized reaction to the terrorism than has been shown up to now. For the moment, Demirel and Ecevit have apparently agreed to work together to allow the Parliament to approve further security legislation, and the military will likely remain behind the scenes at least for the time being—they have no taste for an attempt to run the country directly. But the Turkish General Staff may have threatened to take over the government if cooperation between the two leaders again breaks down. Violence will almost certainly persist, and the assassination of a key political or military figure could of course trigger a military takeover at any point. The important question is whether anything can stop the drift toward political polarization.					
TNF ARMS CONTROL: 2. So far we see no signs of a significant gap between the U.S. and other NATO governments on how to interpret and respond to the new Soviet position on TNF arms control talks. In particular, we do not expect the Europeans to put pressure on the U.S. to include forward-based systems in such talks. The Europeans will not expect talks to begin before Allied consultations in September and further clarification of U.S. and Soviet views on the FBS question, but they would be distressed if the U.S. seemed to delay the opening of talks unduly long. Whether and when Belgium will make its TNF decision remains highly uncertain: the coming winter may provide a politically more favorable moment to address the issue in 25Xdium.					

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SCHMIDT-HONECKER MEETING:

3. The two German leaders will likely meet in late August, but we expect no difficulties to arise from the viewpoint of U.S. interests. Schmidt will be careful not to appear the demandeur at the meeting, and the SPD is already working to restrain expectations in West Germany that the talks will produce major benefits. While the FRG will seek some gains on humanitarian issues, the GDR will press for more economic benefits from the West: neither side wants the encounter to provide occasion for emotional outbursts on the part of East Germans while Schmidt

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SPAIN-NATO:

5. Foreign Minister Oreja's statement last month that Spain may seek
NATO membership as early as next year (under certain conditions) was

probably intended to cause confusion among the Socialists,

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Prime Minister Suarez could

also calculate that the announcement would given Spain more leverage in talks on U.S. base rights in Spain and in negotiations on EC membership. Timing the announcement before President Carter's visit was probably meant to pre-empt criticism of Spain for susceptibility to U.S. pressure on joining the Alliance. Whether the government has really increased or decreased the chances for Spanish entry into NATO any time soon remains an open question, however; domestic controversy over the issue may intensify as a result of Suarez' tactics.

GREECE-NATO:

6. Despite occasional signals from Greek officials that time is running out on efforts to reintegrate Greece into NATO's military organization, we expect that several months remain during which talks on reintegration could go forward. But as Greece moves closer to elections -- likely to to be held sometime next spring -- it will become increasingly difficult for

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the New Democracy government to agree to reintegration. The government could even withdraw its bid to do so, sometime before the elections. The Greeks will continue to link the reintegration issue with arrangements for U.S. use of bases in Greece as a negotiating tactic, but in practice the question of the bases can be addressed separately and the present Greek government is most unlikely to deny them to the U.S.

Joe L. Zaring

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